The e ffect of a ma ndated consume r product safely sla ndard on Ihe nel publi c be nefil is ex pressed in te rm s of the diffe rence betwee n two we ll c ha racterized markel s la les (p re-and post-standard), each of whi c h is assumed 10 be in Siali c equilibrium. The a na lysis is fac ililaled by Irealing the post-s ta nd a rd sta te as one whi c h can be "de rived " from Ihe pre -standa rd s lale by 1) ex pa ndi ng the production cost a nd de ma nd fun cti ons around Iheir inili al market va lues and 2) inlroduc ing modifi ca li ons in the producli on cost fun c li on required for co mplia nce wilh Ihe slandard.
Introduction
It is generall y recognized a nd in fac t ex pected from the language l.l.]l of th e Consumer Prod uc t Safe ty Act that an analys is of th e costs a nd be nefit s associated with a proposed cons um er prod uct safe ty sta ndard be underta ken in support of th a t s ta nd ard. It is th e purpose of this paper-to set out a reaso nabl e a nd ge ne rally applica ble cost benefit framework into which th e various princ ipal costs a nd be nefits ca n be exh ibited and related to one anothe r. In addition, it is also th e purpose of this paper to apply the gene ral method of a nalysis to th e case of a proposed standard for uphol ste red furniture, which sta ndard is designed to avo id the initia ti on of fires by smoldering cigare ttes.
Several studies of this specific case have already been undertaken [2 , 3 ] and a signifi cant ne w a tte mpt to estimate the avoided damages has recently been completed by the National Bureau of Standa rd s [4] . This paper is in support of the latter work and also undertakes the task of providing an overall fra me work for analysis as well as to estimate specifically the effect of the market system per se (prod ucer-s, re taile rs, a nd consumers) on the cost to society of promulgating the standard.
. General Concepts
The problem to be addressed is one in which some industry, i. e., group of firm s, has been producing a product which consumers find useful but for whic h there exists a signifi cant hazard in that use. In this paper, the hazard is assumed to be one which is e ithe r ill pe rceived or totally ignored by consumers , thereby giving ri se to damage costs which li e outside the market syste m of producers and consumers. Such costs or "exte rnaliti es" must be regarded as detrime ntal of the public interest, in that society incurs more damage cost in us ing the product in questi on than it would otherwise be willing to bear if only there had been a mechanism available for proper accounting of those costs and of incorporating improved features of product safety into the ma rk et system. Such a mechanism can be provided by the regulator, e.g., the Consumer Product Safety Co mmi ssion (CPSC). With knowledge of the cause and effect of the hazard as well as of the feasibility of I Figures in brackets indicate lit erature re fe rences at the e nd of thi s paper.
industry to redesign that product at "reasonable" cost, the regulator may set a safety standard for that product with whi ch producers mus t now comply. How well this can be done and indeed whether in a given instance the public interest is served will depend upon how well the regulator can anticipate the costs and benefits which are involved. These include the damage costs avoided by the standard as well as the production and other costs incurred by the industry. These are difficult quantities to estimate, even by "experts."
In between the industrial engineering system which produces the safer product and the consumers who use it lies the regulated market system. Just how this system functions is also uncertain. It is dynamic rather than static and should be treated with econometric methods that allow forecasting. In this paper, however, the simpler approach of "comparative statics" is undertaken . This is one in which two static equilibrium states of the market are envisioned . The first of these constitutes the pre-standard condition and the second the poststandard condition. To realize the latter enough time is presumed to have elapsed that the marke t has once more reached a "steady" state. The above model does not relieve the need to account for certain important time-dependent parameters, a most notable one being the durability or mean lifetime of the product in question. The avoided external damage costs are spread out over this time interval and must therefore be discounted back to present value, in order to be put on the same basis as the purchase price and other terms in the accounting system.
Another time conditioned problem is the one of how industry might sch edule a series of changes or accommodations in production to meet the require ments of the standard. In thi s paper only changes which are initially evident and whic h may also be regarded as only "perturbing" the original production cost fun ction are considered.
Still another problem of considerable significance for performing the analysis indicated has to do with the " market struc ture" of the industry in question. This is conditioned by whethe r the marke t is compe titive or not, and of the relationship among other marke t factors as well. For example, it may be important whether or not re tailing is included under the same management as manufacturing. These and some other factors will be specifi cally dealt with as they are encountered below.
The effect of the standard on cost avoidance is of course at the heart of the safety problem and the belief that the standard could be effective provides the motive for assessing production and market costs such as have been mentioned above. In this paper the cost avoidance will only be indicated in a formal way and not further disected. Special methods, e ntirely ad hoc to those discussed in this paper, are required for their assessment. For example, the method of decision analysis applied to plausible hazard scenarios may be appropriate [4] . The model is intended to be simple, but at the same time useful as a framework for exhibiting the principle components of consumer product safety in a way which it is hoped can aid responsible public interest decision making.
Organization
The paper proceeds by first establishing a number of general concepts and principles, the most important of which is the metric for measuring how well off socie ty can be regarded to be as a function of the value it places upon the product in question , of the cost to produce those products, and of the risk of injury to consumers stemming from their interaction with those same products. This measure termed the net public benefit, 1) , or benefit net of all cost, dependent as it is on the quantities cited, will exhibit a different value in the post as compared with the pre-standard state. Accordingly, its evaluation permits comparison of these two states and of the determination of whether society was made better off or not by promulgation of the standard.
Having established the proper metric, the role of the regulator is discussed and, more particularly, the means by which he sets the standard and effects compliance. New cost terms are identified for the poststandard state which contribute to the net public benefit. Some costs have increased, as for example the costs required to produce the safer product. Other costs have decreased, as for example the damage costs.
This paper not only takes as given these latter avoided costs, but also the basic increment in cost, C, to the industry required to accommodate the standard, i.e., to produce a safer product. The present work thus seeks to incorporate all of the costs and benefits into ~e proper accounting scheme, which scheme includes the effec ts of the market per se, i. e . , of the effect of C on price and demand and how this in turn affects the net public benefit. With the ability to construc t the proper net benefit measure one is the n in a position to c ritique a proposed standard from the point of view of the regulator, and to analyze whether or not th e proposed standard is likely to effe ct a gain in net public benefit. This is carried out under two different models of presumed behavior or decision making on th e part of th e producers.
The first model conside red is the classic marginal cost type model, or one which presumes the producer is able to fine-tun e his production process to optimal conditions (albeit utilizing only a fe w simple parameters). This model results in a reasonably hi ghl y efficient allocation of resources and a correspondingly low "market factor," MF, which fac tor is such that when it is multiplied by the incremental manufacturing cost required to accommodate the standard , yield s the loss to society of bearing the costs of the improved product.
The seco nd model co nside red is termed a "gross decision" model, and is one in whic h the producer is presumed able to arrange his production process so as to realize a certain target profit fraction on sales. In both cases actual operating data are utilized to set the profits and other operating ratios at values actually realized in prac ti ce.
Having fully defin ed the two models of producer-retailer-consumer behavior, four quantities are calculated for each case . Stati sti ca l ope rating data from the manufac turing and retailing industries, along with a price elasticity for home furniture de rived from othe r sources permits th ese calcul a ti ons.
The four quantities calcul a ted are: th e " market facto r," MF; the fra cti onal cha nge in sales volume, tJ.qlq ; the c ha nge in man ufac tured furniture price relative to the manufac turing cost incre me nt , tJ.p ", Ie; and the chan ge in retail price relative to th e same manufacturing cost inc rement, tJ.p it.
Finall y, some estimates of e are ta ken fro m th e work of othe rs [4] at NBS in ord er to indi cate to th e reader approximately how the case for th e proposed furniture sta nd ard comes out; howeve r, th e reade r must pursue this with the forth coming fulle r work on th e subj ec t if he is to apprec iate th e add iti onal complicating details of the case.
Net Public Benefit
Before proceeding with considera tions of the mark e t per se it is important to es tablis h a measure of how well off socie ty is regarded to be in its co nsumption of a product wherein the re exis ts a hazard in use. This measure is termed the " ne t public benefit," YJ , and is the be nefit net of all cost. In the follow ing expression of this quan tity some simplificati ons have been made, e.g., in basi c accepta nce a nd in the use of suitable average unit damage costs [5] ; however, the same e nd results could have been obtained with somewhat greater generality.
Regard th e de ma nd schedule to be deco mposed into a distribution such tha t th e diffe re ntial contribution to the demand, i.e., consumption rate, is give n by:
where V p is an effective value assignment to the utility of the product independent of price and risk assessment. Regard too that the consumer perceives some risk in th e use of that produc t for whicp he requires a compensation [6] , ji r', this being a suitable average value . If the market price be P"" then the demand, q"" is give n by:
This is to say th at unless V p exceeds P 111 by at leas t ji r' th e demand falls to zero.
Though the perceived value of the risk governs demand, the ne t public benefit is also governed by the actua l losses that require compe nsation, V r. The net benefit, YJ , is therefore given by:
where Cp(q, w) is the production cost to yield "q" products per unit time with safety feature w. This is to say that the existence of w gives rise to both the perceived, V r', and actual, V n risk compensati ons. In this formalism safety is regarded to increase with increasing w. If it were possible (socially) to optimize YJ (s ubject to the d emand constraint), the followin g conditions would prevail:
which conditions along with the demand constraint would determine Pm , qm, and w (see appendi x A).
The first of these relationships states that the price should be S.Jt at the margi nal cost to society of produc tion plus unexpected damage. Note that if V r = V r', the classic ris kless marginal cost condition prevails.
The second of these relationships states that the engineered safety feature, w, should be so chosen that the marginal cost of engineered safety is just compensated by the real cost of avoided damages.
Note too , that in the special case wherein V r' = 0, i. e., the consumer ignores safety, the ne t public benefit can be written:
or for greater simplic ity in telminology:
where q = q(P), the demand schedule, and i\(w) is the unit cost or damage lying outside the market system. This is the notation which will be e mployed in the remainder of this paper, terms not accountable by the producer/consumer market being shown beyond the "double bar. "
Perfect Competition
It is now of interest to examine how an industry operating under conditions of perfect competItIOn an d perfect knowledge would respond to the case just outlined . Consider some adequately large number of compe titive firms each producing apparently identi cal products, but wherein the safety feature can be different. Consider too that, although consume rs ignore safety in their demand for the product, the industry could still be held partly liable 'for the personal damages caused by its products. For the i th firm:
where C pi a nd C Ii are the production and liability costs respectively faced by the i th firm, C Ii being the unit liability cost. q i is the production rate of the i th firm, and Wi the safety feature of the i th firms product that correla tes with damages. As was stated earlier all costs spread out in time must be discounted back to present value.
If the ith firm then seeks to optimize its net revenue, 7Ti, where:
then, under a n industry wide price, Pm, this would lead to : The above set of equations could also have been derived from optimizing the following expression:
subject to the demand constraint , and as shown in appendix B. This will be recognized as a partial net publi c be nefit expression such as c ited in (1), but whe rein only those costs fa ced by th e producer are accountable, i. e. , costs up to the " double bar. " The initial (i.e . , prestandard) compl e te ne t public be nefit YJI is therefore give n by: (2) and unde r conditions of peliect knowledge co uld be presum ed to be subject to th e conditions c ited above which optimizes YJI up through the intern al costs. Thus, though petfec t competition a nd pe tfect knowledge of the market would allow society to approach optimum co nditions (e.g., as mi ght be co ntras ted with noncompe titive conditions) it is not of itself s uffi c ie nt to guarantee max imum eco nomic effi c ie ncy. To achieve the latter some portion of the external costs would need to be "internalized ," i. e. , held accountable to producers .
In pass in g it is also worthy to note that th e ne t publi c benefit , e.g . , YJI above, can also be regard ed as th e sum of the net gains of the parti es in the exc hange. For the case above th ese co nsist of consum e r and produce r surpluses. For consumers the gain is th e differe nce between the benefit integral and P ",q", plus extern al damage costs . For producers the surplus or profit is the difference between Pmq", and the produc tion and li ability costs. The exchange term Pmq", thus cancels out in summing the surpluses. The point is raised here so as to alert the reader to certain situations, e. g., as in credit buying, in which this cancellation is not complete, but can give rise to a residual term as shown in appendix C.
Regulatory Action
If now a regulator enters the scene his job may be regarded as one which is to set a standard and effect some complicance penalty so as to " forc e" the producers to raise the safety feature to so me higher level, this level being so chosen as to reduce the ex ternal damage cost significantly more th a n it raises production and other costs. If such can be achieved, the net public benefit as defin ed above will have inc reased. In principle, the regulator would wish to optimize YJ , but in practice would still be co nsidered successful if, by promulgating the s tandard , he would inc rease YJ over its initi al (pre-standard) value.
The me thod of ga ining compliance ca n ta ke on a varie ty of form s, e.g. , through variou s sampling a nd inspecti on sche mes [7] . All such sche mes have associated with the m testin g and ad ministrative costs, both for the prod uce r as we ll as for th e regulator -all of thi s being in addition to the increased produc ti on costs which must also be incurred to produce the safer produc ts.
In effec t the regul a tor creates an artifice or penalty cost fun c tion with which th e producer mus t comply. He cannot actua lly make the producer directly accountable to the external damage costs per se, but only to a new cost which he, the regulator, imposes. The shape of that compliance cost function (including administrative costs) may appear as shown in figure 1. Shown there is a steep compliance function, Cei , designed to force the producer to operate beyond his initial value at -WI to a region -wo, the value sought or anticipated by the regulator. In principle this value would approximately optimize 1)1; however, there are too many complications and uncertainties to expect literal optimization [7] . In any case a perfectly competitive and knowledgeable industry would now act to optimize: subject to the same demand constraint as was previously considered to hold. Thus for the i th firm under the new (post-standard) conditions:
for all i which along with the demand constraint now determines a new set of q i, Wi, and Pm.
Whereas the liability costs may possibly be represented as proportional to the number of products sold multiplied by some constant unit cost (a function of Wi), the compliance costs are likely to consist at least of a fixed and variable part, wherein the variable is dependent upon qi as well as the state of Wi' No attempt will be made in this paper to specify the exact shape of these functions. The same comment holds for the regulatory administrative cost C ri utilized below.
Associated with this "final state" is a final net public benefit, 1)2:
where again the te rms beyond the " double bar" represent the residual external damage as well as the administrative cos t to the regulator required to check compliance for the i th firm .
Again it would be e xpected that external damage costs could be represented as some constant average unit cost (a fun c tion of Wi) multiplied by the number of products sold. The regulatory administrative costs however would consist of at least fix ed and variable parts, as was stated previously for the administrative costs (testing, rejec tion, e tc. ) faced by the producer.
As was also indicated earlier, the public interest would be served if dY/ the change in net benefit, Y/2 -Y/b
were positive. Accordingly, one is interested in:
where q I and q2 are th e quantities produced in th e first a nd second states respectively, a nd dqi = q2i -q I i' For sta te 1, ql = q(PI ) and :
for all i
For sta te 2, q2 = q(P2) a nd:
from which, in principle, one may calculate dy/.
. Perfect Versus Non-Perfect Conditions
It is important first to note that if the change from state 1 to state 2 can be regard ed as infinitesimal, the n to first order dY/ is given by:
Employing (5) it is evident that the sum of terms up to the double bar is zero. This follows simply from the assumption of optimization by industJy of its net revenue in consideration of the actual costs which the industry faces. Thus for there to exist a gain in net public benefit: or since C e' the total (i. e., as opposed to unit) cost < 0, the absolute value of avoided damages I !1C e I must exceed the total cost required to regulate the standard. That is:
if an infinitesimal standard is to be net beneficial.
It is next worthy to note that if noncompetitive conditions prevail the incremental internal terms do not cancel to first order. For example, in a pure monopoly it can be shown that a first order term:
arises where e is the price elasticity given by: evaluated at (q" PI) in this instance. Thus, since both e and !1q are negative, this term further detracts from a possible gain in net public benefit.
Finally, it is particularly important to note also at this point that though producers and retailers may operate under competitive conditions, they do so with impeliect knowledge. In general, suppliers may not be able to operate on marginal dec ision rules such as have been posed above; rather they may need to operate on types of gross rules (based on experienced operating ratios) and of course they may also experience unanticipated outcomes. This failure to anticipate ultimate prices and to manage the supply side of the market perfectly gives rise to additional costs. An analysis utilizing gross rather than marginal decision rules will be developed in a later section. It could constitute the preferred analytical approach. Prior to that the full implication of marginal rule decision making will be explored, and later compared with the gross rule results.
Marginal Analysis -Conceptual
For more substantial changes due to the imposition of the standard, the demand and production cost functions need to be expanded around the original pre-standard market conditions. Whereas under the assumption of constant price elasticity over the limited range from state 1 to state 2, this may readily be accomplished for the demand function, it is not so evident for the production function. Specific insight into production and systems engineering for the particular response to the standard is required. This is tantamount to recognizing that Cp (q;, Wi) is not known, i.e., as a mathematical function over wide ranges of the variables. At best C p may be known as a function of qi in the neighborhood of qil to qi2' For c hanges in Wi however, the industrial engineer would need to estimate costs for particular ways of accommodating the improved safety requirement.
Perhaps the simplest situation is one in which the manufacturer need only incorporate more costly materials into his product, which material changes do not alter his production and assembly process. This case may, for example, be approximated by the home upholstered furniture industry (SIC-2512), which industry may be required by the Consumer Product Safety Commission to meet improved fire resistant upholstered furniture standards (a significant cause of fires being due to ignition of the upholstery by cigarettes). An adequate solution to the proposed standard may be to utilize modified fabrics and padding which are more resistant to ignition or which have been treated with ignition suppressant material [3, 4] . Though these materials are in turn supplied by the textile manufacturers (at some higher cost) responsibility for producing the higher performing product falls primarily to the furniture manufacturer.
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to be set within nan-ow limits n e~r so me an ti c ipated value, say W0 0 The unit extern al damage cost, C e, and the ignition resistant material cost, C w , may appea r approximately as show n in fi gure 2. Thus the total new cos t which th e ith producer fa ces consists of: moreover, if the compliance term C c'i can be broken into fix ed a nd variable costs, the total new cost can also be re presented this way. Hopefully, the adm inistrative portion of these ne w costs will be small « ten percent); how ever, the fix ed portion alone may sometimes be a serious matter for co mpliance by small producers. In what follows the fixed portion of C ci will be ignored and the incremental manufacturing cost will be indicated simply as C. Such a s ituatio n would constitute perhaps the simplest type of change or cost increment in the production segment of the market. Other more complex types of changes to accommodate Wo could alter the original asserpbly process itself and in a non-linear way.
Having conceptualized the case as discussed above, two additional oversimplifications of this conceptualization need be noted. Both have to do with pe rturbations on the supplier of materials to th e manufacturer that are a consequence of th e standa rd . For the industlY in question these would be on the textile producer. The first perturbation has to do with whethe r the sta ndard will so alte r the demand for certa in fabri cs a nd materials that the supply of these mate ri als will be significantl y altered. It is not believed th a t thi s is the case , although some shift in the prices of th ese mate ri als could take place. The extent to whi ch this may occur is suffic iently te nuous th at the effec t was not included in the a nalysis in an interactive way, i. e. , through prescribed couplings such as will be prese nted below betwee n the furniture man ufacturer and the re tailer. The second perturbati on has to do with the imposition of the standard directly on the textile manufacturer. The standard calls for the classificati on of fabri cs accord ing to certain flam mability tests which would then qualify them for certain types of furniture construc tion. Thus the textile manufacturer as well as the furniture manufacturer must comply with certain aspects of the standard. Accordingly, the fabric supplier also experiences certain administrative and testing costs required for compliance. However, these costs are much less severe for the textile manufacturer than for the furniture manufacturer and, as with the other perturbation mentioned, are sufficiently tenuous as to preclude their incorporation in the analysis as interactive elements. Thus the analysis which will be undertaken includes some estimate of this cost; however, it does so by including it only in the estimation of the aforementioned C. Whereas the magnitude of C affects the outcome of the analysis, it does so only as a parameter and not as a variable conditioned by the furniture manufacturing and retailing market.
To analyze this kind of basic case in adequate detail it is necessary to distinguish those "production" costs which depend upon the higher price material input from those which do not. It is necessary therefore to reconsider the basic relationships.
In both the pre-standard and the post-standard states there are costs (few percent) which are proportional to the value of the inventory and final selling price. For example, if the salesman receives a commission this would constitute such a cost. There are also revenues (few percent) which are proportional to the selling price. Credit buying, for example, constitutes such. It may, of course, also be important to account for whether retailing is conducted unde r the same management as manufacturing. In the upholstered household furniture industry these two functions come under separate management, i. e., are carried out by independent firms . In what follows it shall be assumed that both industries are competitive and, therefore , a universal market price, Pm, for identical products is achieved at the interface between manufacturer and retailer, and a second universal price, P s, is realized for the consumer. The furniture industries also appear free of liability costs; accordingly, these latter cost terms will be dropped from the analysis.
For the case of marginal type fine-tuned decision making, the j th retailer would be expected to optimize his net revenue, 7Tj, which is composed approximately as follows: ( 
7)
In this expression C sj is considered to represent the cost of retailing not associated with capital inventory and sales commissions, is represents the financial charges on the inve ntory, and g s represents the commission paid on sales. The effect of credit buying does not appear in this expression, as it has been assumed (see appendix C) that the time payments made by the consumer exactly compensate the seller for the costs that arise from having to receive delayed payments. Optimization of 7Tj yields:
Similarly, the i th manufacturer would be expected to optimize 7Ti, given by:
Again im represents the financial charge on the inventory whose unit cost is V m, and gm represents the commission paid on sales. Optimization of 7Ti yields: (10)
Considering the i and g factors to be fixed and the material cost, V m, to be known, the j-se t of retailing equations and the i-set of manufacturing eq uations taken together along with: determin es all of the q;, qj , as well as Pm and P s.
From a yet broader perspective the apparently "fixed" factors (f, g) could be shown to arise from a more extensive optimization procedure. For example, the practice of paying a commission rather than a salary to salesmen presumably derives from the inc reased ince ntive and therefore increased sales which the salesman realizes when working on a commission. One might regard that the demand is a function of g s as well as P s; however, the details which would lead to th e partic ular trade-off near gs -five percent are not well known. Consequently, such factors are regarded as fix ed with respect to the a nalysis, i. e., to be co nstant for both preand post-standard s tates. Proceeding with the analys is, eac h of the two net public benefit ex pressions ma y be regarded as the sum of the three surpluses: consume r, retaile r, a nd manufacturer, in addition to th e costs lying out ide the market syste m.
where!c is a fac tor which stems from c redit buying, a discussion of which is given in appe ndix C, a nd where Cm is th e inc re me nt in material cost and C 1* the incl·ement in labor cost to compl y with th e standard. For s implic ity C l is assumed to affect only the linear portion of the production cost fun ction .
The change ('1/2 -'1/1) in net benefit thus becomes (see appendix C):
,. Note "L n subscript stands for labor, not liability as it previously did, but whic h terms were dropped from th e analys is.
In addi tion, using (8 ) and (10):
For the marginal case to provide a solution , the two suppl y cost fun c tions, Cpi and CSj must consist of at least three terms in qi and qj , respectively; e.g. , a fixed, linear, and quadrati c term. The quadratic, in particular, is required to limit the produc tion of each firm , i. e . , to provide a rising marginal cost at high supply rates. It is the marginal conditions which allow ready computation of the various supply quantities and their differences (betwee n states 1 and 2). Thus if: (15) (16) from whi ch:
Thus if th ere is no ne t change in inventory, th en to first order:
which rela tions yield I1q , I1P m , and I1P S as shown in appendix E .
In appe ndix D it is readily shown that to second order:
which , when combined with the expressions for !1P s, !1P m , and !1q , permits the calculation of tlYJ, given the parameters invoked. This is undertaken below. First however it should be noted that each of the suppl y fun ctions, C p i, and C sj may be expanded to higher order. For example :
and also :
( (20)
Cancellati o n and comb ina ti on leads to:
Since both !:1P 8 and tlP m will be shown to be proportional to C it is useful to construc t from this expression for AYJ a market fac tor, MF, such that when it is multiplied by qi yield s the loss in ne t public benefit due to the production-consumption process. Accordingly:
which to first order can be written:
To evaluate this expression the results of appendix E need be utilized. There it is shown:
and whe re and
AP8
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In order to ac tually calculate the market fac tor and the other quantities indicated, one must utilize ac tual ope rating data a s may be found, for example, from reports issued by the manufacturing [8] and reta iling [9] associations for the industries in question . In addition, of course, one must utilize some appropriate value for the price elasticity, e . The latter may be found from an analys is of dynamic consumptio n such as is performed annually on the United States economy [10] . With respect to the former, three "ope rating ratios" in eac h industry need to be invoked. These have been chosen as p , the profit , measured as a fraction of sales; F , the fixed costs , again measured as a frac tion of sales; and the ratio of material cost to selling price. These last ratios are V mlP "'I and P ",dP 81 for manufacturing a nd retailing respectively. It must also be understood that the operating ratios are for the initial or prestandard state only. This is not simply for the reason that, as in the case of the standard for the furniture industry this is the only data available, but because these ratios are not fi xed (i.e. , must be allowed to vary) in goin g from the pre-standard to the post-standard state.
For ma nufacturing:
However, from the optimizing marginal co nd ition:
and therefore :
or and In simila r manner:
The key parame ters are thus determined as:
f!-om which one may now cal culate y or ap siC , 6.q / ql and ap lIJC , provid ed one al so ass igns some value to C /P SI ' The results are:
6.q C -= y e --and
Gross Analysis-Conceptual
:c H aving completed th e conceptual analysis for the marginal case , as well as having shown how the parameters in question can be I-ela ted to operating data, it becomes a shorter tas k to indicate how the alternati ve or gross analysis can be carried out.
Whereas in th e marginal case the net re ven ue was regarded to be fin e tunable, this view is dropped for the gross decis ion case in favor of a type of " satisfaction" princ iple, i.e., for a net revenue which is considered to be adequat e a nd expected. Thus, thou gh the same general expressions are used for T] and aT], the details of the supply cost functions are altered as well as the decision rule for the s hares bought and sold .
The
Again we let C = Cm + CtI(1 + 1m) where it should be noted too that the assumption of linearity re C1 fits naturally into the simplet· form of the production cost function.
Noting that each indus try's private cost is of the form (1 -P )Pq and that YJ is the sum of all surplus values:
Defining C and the market factor MF as previously yields:
tlPs tlq / ql
and utilizing the expecte d ne t revenue relations:
Therefore:
In like mann er for re tailing; ql ---Th e ma nipulati on of these re la ti onships is carried out in appe ndi x F in a mann er s imil a r to that utilized in appendi x E, i.e., by eq uating suppl y and demand increme nts . The re it is show n that to first orde r, if a nd the n a nd fin ally: 
In the next secti on the two cases will be numeri cally evaluated and compared for the upholste red furniture industlY·
Numerical Evaluation
All but three of the param eters in voked in the calc ulation of MF were obtained direc tl y or indirec tl y from the two sets of a nnual reports, l8, 9], refe rred to ea rli er. The profit fractions, Pm and Ps as well as the sales commission s, gm and gs, were obtai ned directl y from th e reports . 1m a nd l s were es tim ated on the basis of the "current asset turnove r rate" and a return on ne t wo rth of -ten percent per year. The exact c hoice for these parameters was not c ri tical to th e estimate of MF . Mo re importa nt were th e values chosen for F ml, FSh P"n / PsI' and of course the elas ti city, e. Whereas F ml could be obtained directly from the National Assoc iation of Furniture Manufac ture rs (NAFM) report, F s l was estimated on the assumption of it be ingtwenty perce nt of the operating costs oth er than ma terial costs. * The resulting low value (0.09) makes this choice less critical than the corresponding value-for F mI' Pm]/Ps] is given directly in the National Home Furnishings Association (N HFA) report.
Finally, the elas ticity value was taken from the 1973 econometric analysis of personal consumption expenditures in the various segments of the United States economy [10] . The value cited is for th e industry group SIC 251, "Household Furniture ."
In general , the figures represent broader classes of activities than upholstered furni ture per se, this be ing so for both manufacturing and retailing as well as for the price elasticity utilized; however, it is believed that the representation should correspond reasonably well. The NHF A data, for example, exhibit gross margins for the upholstered furniture component which are nearly the same as for the retail store as a whole.
The ratio C IP s] is based on the cost to effect the basic accommodation divided by an average unit price. As was stated earlier C includes an estimate for administrative compliance by the manufac turer, assumed by NBS [4] and th e source of the information. These "best" values are used to calculate l:l.P siC, I:l.P mlC, I:l.qlq], and MF for the two cases termed "marginal" and "gross," and as displayed in Table II . The estimated range of uncertainty for MF in the gross case is from -1.4 to -1.8, obtai ned by varying the parameters cited in a generous way, the largest uncertainty stemming from the unce rtainty in e. Some further calculations were undertaken in whi ch it was assumed that th e target return was on " net worth" rather than on sales. The results differed in only a negligible way from the ones shown. Accordingly, they have not been reported here.
. Conclusion.
A general approach was outlined which related production and compliance costs of a consumer product safety sta ndard to th e damage costs avoided by the standard . The simplest case, namely, the one in which the production maneuve r only required more costly input material and a linear incremen t in labor, and wherein 476 t T ' ) I , also the market syste m could be regard ed as compe titive, was considered. These general considerations were than applied to the two-stage indu stry arrangeme nt of manufacture rs a nd retailers of upholstered furniture . The pre-and post-sta nda rd co nditions we re related through the ass umption of constant price elasti city and certain other initial and fin a l industry operatin g ratios. In this latter category, for exa mple, was the expected profit ~n sales, a nd the importa nt conseq ue nces arising from th e a umed me th od of dec ision ma kin g by producers , i. e., optima l "fin e tuning" or "gross satisfaction" of profit potential.
The principal result of the a na lys is was th e ge neration of a mark e t factor, MF , whi ch wh e n it is multiplied by the inc remental unit cost to th e manufac turer required to accomm oda te the sta nd ard , yield the unit loss to soc ie ty ari sing from the ma rk et syste m. Thi s loss must yet be compa red with the avoided da mages and regulatory administrati ve costs in ord er to determine if a gain in ne t publi c bene fit is to be realized from imposition of the sta ndard.
In the "gross decision" mod el, whi ch avoids the ass umption of fin e-tuned optimizati on on th e part of th e producer, th e value of MF obta ined for the upholste red furniture case was >= 1. 5 ± 0.3, whe reas in the "fin e tuned" model, the value ofMF obta in ed was -1.2 ± 0. 1. From these conside ra ti ons a " best" value of = 1. 5 (favoring the gross decision model more) was th e n in corporated into othe r studies by NBS to comple te a n anal ysis of the costs and benefits of th e propo ed sta nda rd .
Epilogue
Although th e reader must refer to the cited NBS report [4] if he is to learn th e full details co ncerning the exac t ma nner in whi ch th e results of thi paper we re utilized , it is of inte rest here to ind icate a n approx imate fin al result regarding the expec ted ga in in net publi c benefit.
Two differe nt possible accommodations on the pa rt of producti on we re considered. In th e first th e use of aluminu_m barrie rs along with a boric acid base treatm ent of the cotton batting was postulated. [3] For this system C varied between -$7 a nd $4 pe r unit de pe nding upon the pos tulated di stributi on of fa bric types. In these fi guJ'es a unit sta nds for an "ave rage" of c ha irs and sofas . In the second a less ex pe nsive but more hypotheti cal accommod ation was postula ted which utilized a fa bric backin g of la tex containin g e nca p ul a ted sulphur. F or this syste m C =$2 per unit.
Taking into account certain improvement tre nd s already und erway in the industry, and ma kin g allowa nce for fire loss avo ida nce due to the parallel introduc ti on of smoke de tectors, th e fire loss avoida nce whi c h could be credite d to th e upholstered furnitu re s ta nd ard was estima ted to be -$11 pe r unit. The actual yearl y avoidance loss was estima ted to be -$1. 1 pe r unit. * This fi gure when integrated a nd di scounted (at th e rate of 7 percent, see appe ndi x C) per year over a period of 17 yea rs (the estima ted ave rage life time of the furniture) yielded the savings of $11 pe r unit cited a b~ve.
At a mean re ta il price, P s h of -$140 per unit CjP s l takes the value of 0 .03 to 0.05 for the ba rri e r accommod ation and -0.01 5 for the sulphur accommodation. Using a market factor of -1. 5 yield s societa l costs for accommodating the standard which ra nge from -$3 to -$10 pe r unit. Since th ese values wh e n compared with the avoided cost of $11 per unit break even or show a gain in ne t benefit , it would a ppear tha t the standaJ'd constitutes a likely cost effective maneuve r. It is therefore worth y of further co nsideration by the Consumer Product Safe ty Commission (CPSC).
The author wishes to acknowled ge the excelle nt review and criticis m received of this pa per from Dr. whic h conditions were stated in the text to be optimal for the se t of compe tin g firm s .
Appendix C. Effect of Credit Buying
In th e purc hase of durable goods, c red it buying, i. e. , buying on time, is of co mm on practi ce. In th e case of ho me furniture, for exa mple, approxima tely 70 percent [9] of the purchases a re fin a nced thi s way. Typically -15 perce nt is paid down and th e re ma ind er is eith er "fron t loaded" at -10 perce nt pe r year, or the payments are made monthly at -1 and liz perce nt pe r month on th e bala nce, the te rm of the co ntract usually being -one year. There are thus two categori es of bu ye rs, "cas h" and "c redit."
These two co nsume r gro ups presuma bly ope rate unde r differe nt budge t constra int s and would ex hibit (if the data were available) different elasticities. In add ition, c redit buye rs mu st find it preferable to pay a hi ghe r presen t value for th e produc t in ord er to ob tai n it imm ediately, th a n to save (a t a lower inte rest rate tha n he must pay for c red it) for some future purchase .
Though these two groups are non-id entical a nd some othe r complexities prevail , it will be assumed th at it is poss ibl e to homogenize the m ne ve rtheless, i. e., to represe nt th e m by a joint de mand fun ction. Ass ume too that the selle r charges a t an inte rest rate j co mm e nsura te with a rate of return on hi s in ves tm e nts. The present value, P vs, paid to him is thus:
(ps -P o)(1 + j) Pvs= Po + = Ps 1 + j wh ereas th e present value to the consumer paid by him is given by:
where Po is the a mount of th e re ta il price paid down , and i is the interest rate (i < j ) avail able to co nsum e rs on investment.
For cash buyers evide ntly Pvc = Ps' Accordingly, homogenization of th ese two groups would lead to: Table 1) 479
We may thus regard that: which is to say that: a) the benefits are increased by the factor: 1 + f e' and b) an exchange term -f e(P2q2 -Plql) remains in the net be nefit expression, arising from the fact that the time value of money for consume r a nd reta iler are not the same .
Appendix D. Change in Benefit
The change in consumer benefit resulting from a change in price and volume of sales is given by: whic h integral may be readily evaluated on the assumption of constant price elasticity over the range from q1 to q2. 
Appendix E. Evaluation of LlPs, LlPm, and Llq -Marginal Case
From th e text M s and Mm a re related via th e eq uality of tlq s and tlq ",.
[ ( Note however, K appears in r with a positive sign whereas in 'Y th e te rm k appeared with a negative sign.
Thus, also to first ord er:
Finally:
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